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from Contact to King William’s Act
Philip Girard
In his work The British Empire in America, published in 1708, the historian John
Oldmixon observed casually that in Newfoundland, “there’s no need of much Law, for
the Inhabitants have not much Land and no Money.”1 The premise was correct, but the
conclusion did not necessarily flow.  Observers often lamented the absence of law and
legal institutions in early Newfoundland, and there were a variety of attempts to bring
law to the plantation in the 17th century, all of them strange and unfamiliar to modern
eyes.  None of the apparatus of 19th-century colonial governance was established before
1700: there were no royal governors, no sheriffs, no judges appointed as such (Richard
Whitbourne himself was more of a one-man commission of inquiry), no attorneys, no
barristers, not even that workhorse of empire, the justice of the peace; the first one
would not be appointed until 1729, over a century after the first attempts at coloniza-
tion.  Instead, there were semi-feudal magnates, fishing admirals, naval commanders,
and a parliamentary commissioner.  The fact that the 17th century did not bequeath any
institutional foundation to modern Newfoundland and Labrador does not mean the pe-
riod is of no relevance today. Some very important constitutional ideas and practices with
lasting importance were implanted in that century, as will be argued in my conclusion.       
The paper proceeds in two parts.  Part I describes in broad strokes the formal evolu-
tion of the plantation’s constitution, such as it was, down to King William’s Act of 1699.
The second part will be interpretive.  What meaning can be placed on these events, both
in their historical context, and with an eye to the future?  Here I will do something that
is seldom done, and that is to compare Newfoundland’s experience with that of other
possessions of the English crown, principally Rupert’s Land, granted to the Hudson’s Bay
Company in 1670, and the 17th century Atlantic seaboard colonies that would eventually
turn into the United States.  Legally and functionally, Newfoundland and Rupert’s Land
were similar:  both were “commercial colonies” rather than agricultural ones, devoted to
exploiting a single resource from which the capital generated was channelled to England
rather than retained in the colony.  Settlers were seen as undesirable in both, although
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the Hudson’s Bay Company was more easily able to enforce this policy by returning Com-
pany employees to Britain at the end of their service.  This slow growth of a resident Eu-
ropean population in turn delayed the movement for self-government already obvious by
the later 17th century in the much more populous southern colonies.  
I.   The seventeenth-century constitution of Newfoundland
For most of the 17th century there was little doubt that colonial affairs were part of
the royal prerogative. Consequently, with a brief exception in the 1650s after the Eng-
lish civil war, parliament did not became involved in Newfoundland’s constitutional af-
fairs until the Act of 1699.  Even then, as we will see, the Act of 1699 merely ratified legal
solutions that had already developed on the ground—or more precisely, at the interface
of land and sea.  Thus, the constitution of Newfoundland was contained in direct em-
anations of the prerogative such as the charters of the London and Bristol Company
(1610), those granted to Sir George Calvert (1623) and Sir David Kirke (1637), and the
Western Charter of 1634, which was followed by a series of orders in council that merely
recapitulated or amended it.2
However, these formal constitutional laws acknowledged and to some extent com-
peted with an informal law that was much older.  From some time in the 16th century,
the hundreds of ships that arrived from March onwards had to find a way to resolve
their conflicts over access to the shore.  The English conducted an inshore fishery based
on the “dry cure”; this involved erecting wooden flakes upon which split cod were ex-
posed to dry.  Given the climate of Newfoundland, even in the summer this could take
some time so that access to wood and suitable drying spaces was crucial.3 And in spite
of the island’s very lengthy coastline, there were a limited number of such sites available.
The potential conflict over these spaces was resolved by a tradition that the captain of
the first ship arriving in a particular cove was recognized as the “fishing admiral” who
could take such space as he liked and was then recognized as having the authority to reg-
ulate disputes among later arrivals for the season.  The next year the whole process
started over again, as Europeans did not overwinter on the island.4 As Peter Pope and
others have shown, this was not just an English tradition but one that was respected by
the representatives of various nations and ethnic groups who also conducted inshore
fishing during the period.  
For various reasons the British Crown became interested in supporting schemes for
permanent settlement in Newfoundland in the early 17th century.  These settlements
had the potential to occupy the best coastal sites to the exclusion of the migratory fish-
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ers, leading to constant tensions between the two groups.  First we will concentrate on
these settlements and then return to the tensions.  
Both the corporate form of the London and Bristol Company and the proprietor-
ships of Calvert and Kirke were popular ways for European monarchs of the early mod-
ern period to extend their sovereignty in North America by means of delegated powers
to private parties, thus insulating the crown from direct financial risk.  They were the
instruments through which European states sought to exploit North America’s re-
sources, protect their investments, normalize their presence on the continent, and deal
with each other and with native peoples.  
All the charters had to set up governance structures, as European monarchs of the
first half of the 17th century did not yet have the financial or administrative resources
that would allow them to rule directly through Crown agents.  The French in New
France followed the same path, until Louis XIV took over the colony directly in 1663-
64.  The London and Bristol Company, like the Hudson’s Bay Company later in the
century, had a governing council which was to sit in London, and it could and did ap-
point local governors to govern its territories in Newfoundland, first John Guy (1612-
1616) and then John Mason (1616-1621). It also had the power to “make ordayne and
establishe all manner of orders lawes direccons instruccons formes and ceremonies of
go[v]ument and magistracie fit and necessarie for … the go[v]ument of the saide-
Colonye”.5 The governor was to carry out these laws but also had a broad discretion to
establish his own laws “in cause of necessitie” provided they were “as neere as conve-
niently be agreeable to the lawes, statutes, go[v]uments and policie of this our Realme
of England”.6  It is perhaps necessary to point out that these “governors” did not hold
royal commissions and were responsible only to the company, not the king or the Eng-
lish government, in spite of the seeming amplitude of their powers. In any event, the
London and Bristol Company had ceased to function by the early 1620s, and indeed
the corporate vehicle was being gradually replaced by the proprietorship as the favoured
instrument of colonization by this time.7 Some corporations continued to be created,
however, and the charter of the Hudson’s Bay Company, created in 1670, proved to be
the longest-lived of all the 17th century charters.      
Before looking at the proprietorships of Calvert and Kirke, it is useful to consider
briefly the question of the applicability of English law in Newfoundland.  We often as-
sume that English settlers brought the common law with them, and this idea did become
established in the 18th century, but in the 17th things were more complex.  No less an
authority than Sir Edward Coke stated in 1628 that “the common law meddles with
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nothing that is done beyond the seas.”8 The crown was not bound by the common law
in its dealings with the inhabitants of its overseas plantations, and none of the 17th cen-
tury documents purported to export it to Newfoundland.  The laws governing the royal
prerogative, the lex coronae, derived from the law of nations and nature and from Roman
law.9
However, English-born colonists or their issue born overseas were still English sub-
jects and so retained the “English liberties that are incident to their persons” according
to Matthew Hale.10 As long as the subject remained in allegiance, the monarch was
bound to govern by the rules of natural equity, i.e., not to interfere arbitrarily with life,
liberty or property.  This was an idea deriving from natural law and Roman law, which
thus set some limits to the exercise of the royal prerogative.  An important right in this
context was the right of the subject to appeal to the monarch if he or she felt that these
liberties were infringed by a mere deputy such as a governor.11 So even though we tend
to equate the royal prerogative with an almost unlimited discretion, even here there
was some nascent concept of the rule of law growing out of the quasi-contractual rela-
tionship between monarch and subject.   
The grant of Newfoundland to the London and Bristol Company had been in free
and common socage, but that was not to be the case for the proprietorships granted to
Calvert and Kirke.  Calvert had been secretary of state to James I and was thus well
placed to secure a grant for his colonizing endeavours after the failure of the London and
Bristol Company.  James also made him an Irish peer, naming him the first Lord Balti-
more, the name by which he is more commonly known today since he was later granted
the province of Maryland as proprietor.  The charter issued to him in April 1623 did not
cover all of Newfoundland, but was restricted to the greater part of the Avalon penin-
sula.  It was Calvert himself, a late convert to Catholicism, who gave his colony the
name the peninsula still bears today, Avalon in Somersetshire being a site long associ-
ated with the origins of Christianity in Britain.  
Calvert was granted Avalon in a feudal tenure, “in Capite by Knights service,” and
was given the palatine jurisdiction of the Bishop of Durham, which is to say the most
extensive jurisdiction granted to any subject next to the king himself.12 As Christopher
Tomlins observes, in Britain itself this type of jurisdiction was limited to Ireland and to
marchlands; it was “designed for remote and contested regions [so as to] allow author-
ities to exercise effective regional sovereignty.”13 Pursuant to this authority Calvert could
appoint such judges and magistrates as he liked. Further, he was granted the power to
make laws on any subject whatsoever, provided they were not contrary to reason or re-
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pugnant to the laws of England, “with the Advice, assent and approbacon of the Free-
holders of the said Province or the greater part of them,” whom Calvert was to “Assem-
ble in such sort, and forme as to him shall seeme best.”14 And in case of urgent necessity,
Calvert could dispense even with this approbation and make laws on his own as long as
they were published.  Clearly this assembly was to be largely dependent and not to inter-
fere with the extensive powers granted to this feudal magnate, powers which even ex-
tended to “Takeing away Member or Life” if the “quality of the Offence” required it.15
Calvert had a large manor house built for himself, his family and retinue at Ferry-
land harbour, the foundations of which still survive.16 In a more literary or mythical
sense, it lives on in the title of Wayne Johnston’s 1999 memoir Baltimore’s Mansion.17
Calvert spent the winter of 1628-29 there and, after observing that winter did not lift
until May, decided that was enough of that and left to pursue his colonizing initiatives
in the gentler climate of Chesapeake Bay.  He died in 1632 and his son Cecilius, the sec-
ond Lord Baltimore, appointed a resident governor to look after the few remaining
colonists.  In spite of this action, in 1637 the Privy Council declared that Calvert had
“abandoned” Avalon and granted a new patent to Sir David Kirke, an adventurer who
was already familiar with North America as he and two of his brothers had been in-
volved in the expedition that captured Quebec from the French in 1629;18 another of
his brothers would be one of the initial investors in the Hudson’s Bay Company, and this
brother’s daughter would become the first wife of Pierre-Esprit Radisson.  The Kirkes,
born in Dieppe to an English merchant who conducted cross-Channel trade, had the
cultural background, the court connections and the boldness to exploit the commercial
opportunities opening up in northern North America in the “era of discovery.”  
The Kirke patent expanded Calvert’s territorial authority from Avalon to “that
whole continent Island and Region … commonly knowne by the name of Newfound-
land,” and named him the “true and absolute Lord and Proprietor” of it.19 Like Calvert’s
patent it was granted in knight’s service but unlike his it did not grant palatine author-
ity. Even without it, however, it is clear that Kirke was effectively a viceroy, empowered
to make laws with the assent of the freeholders and to appoint magistrates, but his au-
thority was significantly limited in one very important respect. He was specifically pro-
hibited from exercising any authority over the migrant fishers, and his patent forbade the
“inhabitants” from taking up the best fishing places in advance of the arrival of the mi-
grant ships.20
So here we see an attempt to reconcile the interests of the migratory fishery, sup-
ported by the English West Country merchants, with those of the new settlers, or planters
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as they were called.21 The West Country merchants lobbied the Privy Council to protect
their interests, and the result was the Western Charter of 1634, promulgated between
Calvert’s departure and Kirke’s arrival.  It aimed to protect the rights of the migrant
fishers by declaring that they were subject only to the king’s direct authority, and not
to that of the local magnates such as Kirke. The Charter took up some of the problems
that Richard Whitbourne had pointed out some fifteen years earlier:  it prohibited the
casting out of ballast into the harbours, the overuse of wood, interfering with the nets,
flakes or fishing gear of others, and the setting up of taverns.21 It confirmed the “aun-
cient custom” of the first comer being named as admiral.  But it created no local en-
forcement mechanism:  offences committed on land in Newfoundland could only be
brought before the mayors of Plymouth and various West Country ports, while those
committed on sea had to be brought before the vice-admiralty courts in Southampton,
Dorset, Devon or Cornwall.22 The Hudson’s Bay Company charter, by contrast, em-
powered Bayside governors to “judge all persons belonging to the said Governor and
Company that shall live under them” but likewise contained a clause permitting of-
fenders to be transported “into this Kingdome of England” for trial and punishment if
that were “thought most convenient,” although this option was not exercised until the
late 18th century.
David Kirke evicted William Hill, the governor Lord Baltimore had left behind, and
moved into the Calverts’ manor house.24 From here he and his family held sway over
the settlement for much of the rest of the century, interrupted for a time when Oliver
Cromwell’s government took an interest in the island in the 1650s and appointed com-
missioners to govern it.  Kirke held a manorial court around Ferryland for some time,
though unfortunately the records have not survived.25 The Calverts tried to reassert
their rights to Avalon (Sir David died in 1654 in England while in prison as a result of
Calvert litigation) and succeeded in theory soon after the Restoration but were unable
to enforce their rights on the ground.  As Wayne Johnston observes, “[t]he impossibly
complicated and protracted litigation over Avalon makes the lawsuits in Bleak House
seem expeditious by comparison.”26 The conflict between the Calverts and the Kirkes
eventually petered out in the mid-18th century with both claims being declared invalid.
Meanwhile, the Privy Council tinkered with the Western Charter after the Restoration
and its provisions were more or less codified in King William’s Act of 1699.  Prior to that,
in 1675, the Privy Council had ordered the naval commodore Sir John Berry to remove
all the inhabitants of Newfoundland but he did not follow those orders and the planta-
tion continued to struggle along.27
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The Kirkes had no way of exerting their authority much beyond Ferryland itself,
and in the later 17th century, a new form of quasi-government emerged with the estab-
lishment of naval authority.  As an English admiralty lawyer sent out to investigate mat-
ters in Newfoundland in 1701 observed, 
It hath been customary for the commander in chief upon complaints to
send his Lieutenant to the several harbours and coves to decide all dif-
ferences and disputes that happen betwixt commanders of merchant
ships and the inhabitants and planters and betwixt them and their ser-
vants.28
Examples of these kinds of proceedings can be found as early as 1680. The two streams
of authority—the fishing admirals and the navy—were brought together in King
William’s Act by the expedient of providing for appeals from the former to the latter.  
In other respects King William’s Act simply repeated the provisions of the Western
Charter of 65 years earlier. It did not set down any penalties for the various offences it
created, and provided that felonies committed in Newfoundland had to be tried in any
English county court.  King William’s Act was not meant to provide a formal constitu-
tion for Newfoundland, and did not do so.  As has recently been demonstrated, it was
not even a government bill, but rather one put forward by various mercantile interests
with a view to keeping the terms of the Newfoundland fish trade as free as possible.29
II.   What is the significance of Newfoundland’s 17th-century constitution?
The constitutional development of 17th century Newfoundland may seem quaint,
foreign, or simply bizarre.  But in many respects it followed, on the surface at least, a path
similar to the course of events in Britain’s more southerly possessions.  In a recent ac-
count of the role of law in colonizing English America, Calvert’s patent is even seen as
a turning point.  “From the early 1620s,” writes Christopher Tomlins, “English charters
made palatine authority and institutions key features of the evolving design of North
American colonization.”30 The patent to Maryland given to Calvert’s son Cecilius was
even more expansive than that granted to his father, and was “remarkable for its com-
bination of palatine vice-regality with virtually unrestricted land tenures.”31 Calvert
junior was permitted to grant land in fee simple or fee tail to be held of himself, not the
crown, the statute of Quia Emptores notwithstanding; i.e., he was allowed to subinfeu-
date, which had not been permitted in England for over 300 years.  Several of the east-
ern seaboard colonies did follow the Calvert model, and yet we know their subsequent
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constitutional development was very different from that of Newfoundland.  What hap-
pened?  
In the proprietary colonies south of Maine the vast powers granted to proprietors
such as Cecilius Calvert did not last long in the face of pressures for self-government.
In fact the proprietors tended to face pressure from both top and bottom in the later 17th
century:  from the Crown which tried to resume some of the control it had delegated
earlier in the century; and from the settlers, who assumed that they should have the
right to govern themselves and were not content to be represented in a milque-toast as-
sembly that was expected to rubber-stamp the proprietor’s own legislative initiatives.
By the end of the 17th century the assemblies had taken over lawmaking authority, sub-
ject only to the governor’s veto and possible Crown disallowance.  In some colonies the
proprietor had a technical veto but it had declined rapidly in practical effect, just as the
Crown’s veto had declined in Britain itself.32 Queen Anne’s refusal to assent to the
Scottish Militia Bill of 1708 was the last time it was exercised by a British monarch.   
The main reasons why Newfoundland did not follow the trajectory of the more
southerly colonies are twofold:  the population and the resource—too few people and
too many cod. Population growth was too slow, such that no assembly of freeholders
who might have challenged Kirke as proprietor was ever called. The eastern shore of the
Avalon Peninsula had only 1700 or so permanent inhabitants in the 1670s, though thou-
sands more visited seasonally.  But growth was slow in large part because Newfound-
land’s main resource, cod, could be effectively exploited with a mobile, largely migratory
labour force, unlike the agricultural colonies to the south.  And although cod was a
hugely valuable resource, the capital from its exploitation stayed in England, in the
hands of the West Country merchants, unlike the capital generated by American agri-
culture, much of which stayed in the colonies.  Those English merchants who provided
capital for the fishing industry did not wish to see it taxed in order to pay for a local gov-
ernment.  They eventually saw that some settlement was useful, but still did not wish
to pay for it.  Thus governance and the administration of justice gradually migrated to
the one institution already on the local scene that could carry out these tasks at little
additional cost:  the Royal Navy.  
Slow population growth left the colony vulnerable to metropolitan manoeuvrings.
As we saw, in 1675 the Privy Council wanted all the permanent inhabitants of New-
foundland removed,and the idea continued to be mooted until the 1720s and even later.
After peninsular Nova Scotia was ceded to Britain by the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, the
British government seriously considered transferring all the inhabitants of Newfound-
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land to its new possession, where the land was much more propitious for agriculture.
(The French actually did so, transferring the inhabitants of their former colony at Plai-
sance (Placentia) to the new settlement to be established at Louisbourg.) When that
idea was scrapped, the British government finally decided to endow the island with a
minimal year-round governmental infrastructure to supplement the system of seasonal
naval governance that had grown up since the 1680s, appointing the first justices of the
peace in 1729.34
The combined effect of slow population growth and the power of metropolitan mer-
chants over the Newfoundland cod economy ensured that local institutions powerful
enough to challenge metropolitan control did not develop, as they did in the Atlantic
seaboard colonies, which had a population of a quarter million by 1700.  Jerry Bannis-
ter has argued that the system of naval governance found in Newfoundland in the eigh-
teenth century was effective and suitable for local circumstances.  That may well be; the
main point being made here is that the navy was not really accountable to the inhabi-
tants, leading to an attitude that government was an outside force to be endured, even
if it brought some benefits, rather than the product of collective decision-making.  This
point will be expanded upon in the conclusion.      
A second theme in the early constitutional development of Newfoundland con-
cerns relations with the native people.  Given the eventual extinction of the Beothuk,
Newfoundland may not immediately leap to mind as a model of settler-aboriginal rela-
tions.  But in the 17th century at least, there was a desire on the European side for har-
monious relations and no obvious sign of the fate that awaited the Beothuk a century
later.  There must have been encounters between the Beothuk and seasonal fishers in
the 16th century, but the first recorded encounter with the English is that of John Guy
in 1610.  He provides a charming account of meeting with eight Beothuk men, during
which they shared food, traded furs for European goods, sang and danced together.  The
Beothuk did not like beer but did appreciate aquavitae, and discovered the musical
properties of empty bottles:  “And one of them blowing in the aquavitae bottle yt made
a sound, which they fell all into a laughture at.”35 Richard Whitbourne speaks mostly
favourably of the Beothuk in his 1620 Discourse and Discovery.  He is quite keen on
Christianizing them, but strikes a universalist note in his observation that “even we our-
selves were once as blind as they in the knowledge and worship of our Creator, and as
rude and savage in our lives and manners.”36 He even suggests that the Beothuk would
aid in the process of settlement by teaching Europeans about the landscape and re-
sources. For this reason he encouraged settlement of the area near Trinity, where the
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Beothuk were known to live.  Should this advice be followed, he declared,  
I see no reason to the contrary, but that a speedy and more certaine
knowledge might be had of the Countrey, by reason those savage peo-
ple are so neere; who being politikely and gently handled, much good
might be wrought upon them:  for I have had apparant proofes of their
ingenuous and subtile dispositions, and that they are a people full of
quicke and lively apprehensions.37
Whitbourne gained his knowledge from the French and Basques who had had more ex-
tensive relations with the Beothuk, and possibly from John Guy as well.  
What does the Calvert patent have to say about relations with the indigenous in-
habitants?  There is only one paragraph, and it reads as follows: 
And because in soe remote a Country, and scituate amongst soe many
Barbarous nations, the Incursions as well of ye Salvages themselves, as
of other Enimies, Pirats, and Robbers, may probably be feared, There-
fore wee have given … power unto the said Sr George Calvert Knt.  his
Heires and Assignes by himself or his Captaines or other his Officers to
Leavye, Muster and Traine, all sorts of men whatsoever, … to make
warre and prosecute the Enimies and Robbers aforesaid as well as by Sea
as Land, … to vanquish and take them and being taken to putt them
to death by the Lawe of war, or to save them, as the said Sr George
Calvert, his heires and assignes shall thinkefitt.38
The Kirke patent contained the same clause almost verbatim.  The patents contem-
plate possible attacks by native peoples and by Europeans, and clothe Calvert and then
Kirke with the authority to raise a militia to defend the settlements and effectively to
declare martial law.  This is not surprising:  the New World was known to be a danger-
ous place, and proper caution demanded that some kind of defensive mechanism be
provided to would-be colonizers.  But it is to be noted that the attacks of “Enimies, Pi-
rats and Robbers”—Europeans—are at least as much on the mind of the patent drafter
as those of “ye Salvages.”  And in fact the eastern shore of Newfoundland was plagued
with pirates in the 17th century.  Chief among these was the arch-pirate Peter Easton,
who raided ships with impunity from Trinity Bay to Ferryland in the 1610s, built a fort
at Harbour Grace, pressed men into his service, and in fact captured Richard Whit-
bourne and kept him prisoner for 11 weeks, releasing him only after Whitbourne agreed
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to seek a pardon for him.  Easton inflicted losses of some 20,000 pounds on the fishing
fleet before heading off to the Mediterranean for more piratical adventures.39 In addi-
tion to this the French and the Dutch were always waiting in the wings, threatening
and attacking the small English settlements when opportunity presented.  The few
depredations of the Beothuk, who sometimes took fishing gear that the English left be-
hind for the winter, were a negligible annoyance in comparison.      
Yet a scholar has recently interpreted the Calvert patent as the first that “concep-
tually, expelled indigenous populations from the territory it covered and authorized un-
inhibited warfare against them.”40 Aboriginal dispossession takes centre stage in
Christopher Tomlins’s account of English colonizing in America, and rightly so, and
there is much in his account of the legal technique of dispossession with which to agree.
Speaking of the 17th century, he argues that 
the narrative of English colonizing is one that progressively banishes
existing inhabitants to the margins of its consciousness by denying their
civic capacity, their sociability.  In the English narrative the indigenous
become brutes, in whose place the colonizer first desires, then actively
imagines, an empty landscape to populate anew. … [In this telling, the
charters] elevated land over people as the primary object of the colo-
nizer’s attention.  It rearranged both the legalities and the institutional
mechanisms of colonizing accordingly.41
Such an interpretation has considerable force in the agricultural colonies south of
Maine, where direct competition between Europeans and indigenous peoples, who also
practised agriculture, was dramatic, savage, and prolonged. 
But neither in Newfoundland nor in Rupert’s Land was there competition between
natives and newcomers for the land resource.  In Rupert’s Land the whole raison d’être
for the British presence was the exploitation of furs provided by indigenous suppliers.
Conflict with native peoples was anathema to the HBC and the establishment of a mu-
tually beneficial trading relationship was the only way to extract profit from the terri-
tory.  
In Newfoundland there was competition between the English themselves over par-
ticular favoured coastal locations, and to some extent between the English and those of
other nations.  But the Beothuk are not thought to have inhabited the Avalon Penin-
sula before European arrival, and were only lured there occasionally by the prospect of
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acquiring metal goods.  Much later, it is true, with the expansion of European settlement,
there was competition for coastal access, and it may be that this played a role in the de-
cline and ultimate disappearance of the Beothuk.  But that was an 18th century phe-
nomenon.  The Calvert and Kirke patents can be seen as providing, prudently, for
European defence in case of attack by indigenous people, but they do not “elevate land
over people as the primary object of the colonizer’s attention,” as Tomlins asserts, be-
cause land was virtually irrelevant in Newfoundland except for the coastal fringe.  There
was no agricultural frontier. The English interest in the Beothuk, as demonstrated by
Whitbourne, was developing the fur trade with them and learning what they could
about this new environment from them, not in “clearing the decks” for an agricultural
colony.42 However, the Beothuk were not necessary to the prosecution of the fishery in
Newfoundland as they were to the fur trade in Rupert’s Land, and their presence was
thus less valued by Europeans.    
III.   Conclusion
In his magisterial study of the 17th-century Newfoundland fishery, Peter Pope draws
a distinction between a vernacular industry and a directed one.  A directed industry is
more of a top-down model, whereas a vernacular one evolves more or less spontaneously
based on the opportunity to exploit a particular resource.  A vernacular industry tends
to be governed by custom rather than written protocols and directives, and can respond
nimbly to new challenges and opportunities.  Pope does not apply this binary to law but
I am going to suggest that it provides a useful perspective on constitutional law in 17th
Newfoundland.  Richard Whitbourne was one of the first of a long line of imperial mis-
sionaries who sought to interest the British Crown in exerting a more robust form of
authority over the plantation.  But the island’s radically decentralized pattern of settle-
ment and small population presented a challenge to all such schemes.  Except for a few
occasions when removal of all the inhabitants was contemplated, the Crown wished to
maintain a skeleton crew of settlers for geo-political reasons, to prevent others European
nations from claiming the island.  Yet it was for a long time unwilling to tax the fishing
industry to support local institutions of governance.  Via the Royal Navy, the Admi-
ralty and other imperial institutions the Crown provided some means to resolve dis-
putes between the settlers and the migratory fishers.  But for most purposes, the settlers
were left to their own devices.  This was in marked contrast to the colony of Canada,
for example, where by 1700 the French had reproduced all the legal structures of provin-
cial France and introduced virtually all of French law, for a population of some 14,000
souls strung out along the St. Lawrence Valley.  This contrast is not meant to imply that
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Newfoundland was lawless, merely that its inhabitants were obliged to develop their
own, vernacular, means of ordering, and that these tended to reside at the most local
level.  Even here they were unsanctified by any authority other than local custom, but
this type of communal self-government proved very long-lasting.  Municipal govern-
ment in the modern sense was very slow in coming to Newfoundland; even St. John’s
did not get a “Municipal Board” until 1888, most town councils were not formed until
after 1949 and a number of communities even today possess no formal local govern-
ment.43 Nor was the full panoply of English law particularly necessary.  Much of it had
to do with estates in land, which were not recognized in Newfoundland.  King William’s
Act did recognize a form of property in coastal parcels called ship’s rooms which had
been occupied prior to 1685, but this property was treated as a chattel interest, not re-
alty, a custom finally codified in the Chattels Real Act of 1834—a statute long a source
of puzzlement to real property scholars in the rest of Canada but perfectly understand-
able in the Newfoundland context.44 As Jerry Bannister has demonstrated, when gu-
bernatorial proclamations and statutory law eventually did arrive, they often codified
solutions that had already been locally arrived at, although the malleability of custom
meant that it was relatively easy for the more powerful to bend the law to serve their own
interests.45
While King William’s Act was not meant to provide a constitution for Newfoundland,
in a sense it recognized that one already existed. The principal concern of that consti-
tution, evident in the Western Charter of 1634 and subsequent orders-in-council down
to the 1699 Act itself, was free trade in fish, to which all other rights, liberties and du-
ties were subordinated.  The Newfoundland plantation was thus the exact obverse of Ru-
pert’s Land, where the Hudson’s Bay Company possessed a monopoly over the fur trade,
one that it jealously guarded until it surrendered its vast territories to Canada. Free
trade in fish required a minimum of government regulation and inspired a suspicion of
state authority, but at the same time created space for local law to flourish in the nooks
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